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Abstract
Risk management has become increasingly politicized and contentious. Polarized views,
controversy, and conflict have become pervasive. Research has begun to provide a newperspective
on this problem by demonstrating thecomplexity of the concept "risk" and the inadequacies of the
traditional view of risk assessment as a purely scientific enterprise.
This paper argues that danger is real,but riskis socially constructed. Risk assessment is
inherently subjective andrepresents a blending of science and judgment with important
psychological, social, cultural, and political factors. Inaddition, our social and democratic
institutions, remarkable as they are in many respects, breed distrust in the risk arena.
Whoever controls the definition of risk controls the rational solution to the problem at hand.
If risk is defined one way, thenone option will rise to the top as the mostcost-effective or the safest
or the best. If it is defined another way, perhaps incorporatingqualitative characteristics and other
contextual factors, one will likely get a different ordering of action solutions. Defining risk is thus
an exercise in power.
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Scientific literacy and public education are important, but they are not central to risk
controversies. The public is not irrational. The public is influenced by emotion and affect in a way
that is both simple and sophisticated. So are scientists. The public is influenced by worldviews,
ideologies, and values; so are scientists, particularly when they are working at the limits of their
expertise.
The limitations of risk science, the importance and difficulty of maintaining trust, and the
complex, sociopolitical nature of risk point to the need for a new approach — one that focuses upon
introducing more public participation into both risk assessment and risk decision making in order to
make the decision process more democratic, improve the relevance and quality of technical analysis,
and increase the legitimacy and public acceptance of the resulting decisions.
Recognizing interested and affected citizens as legitimate partners in the exercise of risk
assessment is no short-term panacea for the problems of risk management. But serious attention to
participation and process issues may, in the long run, lead to more satisfying and successful ways to
manage risk.
1.0 Introduction
The practice of risk assessment has steadily increased in prominence during the past several
decades, as risk managers in government and industry have sought to develop more effective ways
to meet public demands for a safer and healthier environment. Dozens of scientificdisciplines have
been mobilized to provide technical information about risk, and billions of dollars have been
expended to createthis information and distill it in the context of risk assessments.
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Ironically, as our society and other industrialized nations have expended this great effort to
make life safer and healthier, many in the public have become more, rather than less, concerned
about risk. These individuals see themselves as exposed to more serious risks than were faced by
people in the past, and they believe that this situation is getting worse rather than better. Nuclear and
chemical technologies (exceptfor medicines) have been stigmatized by being perceivedas entailing
unnaturally great risks (Gregory, Flynn, & Slovic, 1995). As a result, it has been difficult, if not
impossible, to find host sites for disposing of high-level or low-level radioactive wastes, or for
incinerators, landfills, and other chemical facilities.
Public perceptions of risk have been found to determine the priorities and legislative agendas
of regulatory bodies such as the Environmental Protection Agency, much to the distress of agency
technical experts who argue that other hazards deserve higher priority. The bulk of EPA's budget in
recent years has gone to hazardous waste primarily because the public believes that the cleanup of
Superfund sites is the most serious environmental threat that the country faces. Hazards such as
indoor air pollution are considered more serious health risks by experts but are not perceived that
way by the public (U.S. EPA, 1987).
Great disparities in monetary expenditures designed to prolong life, as shown in Table 1,
may also be traced to public perceptions of risk. As noteworthy as the large sums of money devoted
to protection from radiation and chemical toxins are the relatively small sums expended to reduce
mundane hazards such as automobile accidents. Other studies have shown that serious risks from
national disasters such as floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes generate relatively little public
concern and demand for protection (Palm, 1995; Kunreuther, in press).
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Table 1
Costs of a year of life saved by various interventions
• Flu shots $500
• Water chlorination $4,000
• Pneumonia vaccination $12,000
• Breast cancer screening $17,000
• All medical interventions $19,000
• Construction safety rules $38,000
• All transportation interventions $56,000
• Highway improvement $60,000
• Home radon control $141,000
• Asbestos controls $1.9 million
• All toxin controls $2.8 million
• Arsenic emission controls $6.0 million
• Radiation controls $10.0 million
Source: Adapted from Tengs et al. (1995).
Such discrepancies are seen as irrational by many harsh critics of public perceptions. These
critics draw a sharp dichotomy between the experts and the public. Experts are seen as purveying
risk assessments, characterized as objective, analytic, wise, and rational — based upon the real
risks. In contrast, the public is seen to rely upon perceptions of risk that are subjective, often
hypothetical, emotional, foolish, and irrational (see, e.g., DuPont, 1980 or Covello, Flamm,
Rodricks, & Tardiff, 1983). Weiner (1993) defends the dichotomy, arguing that "This separation of
reality and perception is pervasive in a technically sophisticated society, and serves to achieve a
necessary emotional distance ..." (p. 495).
In sum, polarized views, controversy, and overt conflict have become pervasive within risk
assessment and risk management. A desperate search for salvation through risk-communication
efforts began in the mid-1980s — yet, despite some localized successes, this effort has not stemmed
the major conflicts or reduced much of the dissatisfaction with risk management. This
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dissatisfaction can be traced, in part, to a failure to appreciate the complex and socially determined
nature of the concept "risk." In the remainder of this paper, I shall describe several streams of
research that demonstrate this complexity and point toward the need for new definitions of risk and
new approaches to risk management.
2.0 The Need for a New Perspective
New perspectives and new approaches are needed to manage risks effectively in our society.
Social science research has provided some valuable insights into the nature of the problem that,
without indicating a clear solution, do point to some promising prescriptive actions.
Forexample, early studies of riskperception demonstrated that the public's concerns could
not simply be blamed on ignorance or irrationality. Instead, research has shown thatmany of the
public's reactions to risk (including reactions that may underlie the data in Table 1) can beattributed
to a sensitivity to technical, social, and psychological qualities of hazards thatare notwell-modeled
in technical risk assessments (e.g., qualities suchas uncertainty in risk assessments, perceived
inequity in thedistribution of risks and benefits, and aversion to being exposed to risks thatare
involuntary, not under one's control, or dreaded). The important role of socialvalues in risk
perception and risk acceptance has thus become apparent (Slovic, 1987).
More recently, another important aspect of the risk-perception problem has come to be
recognized. This is the role of trust. In recent years there have been numerous articles and surveys
pointing out the importance oftrust inrisk management and documenting the extreme distrust we
now have in many of the individuals, industries, and institutions responsible for riskmanagement
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(Slovic, 1993). This pervasive distrust has also been shown to be strongly linked to the perception
that risks are unacceptably high and to political activism to reduce those risks.
A third insight pertains to the very nature of the concept "risk." Current approaches to risk
assessment and risk management are based upon the traditional view of risk as some objective
function of probability (uncertainty) and adverse consequences. I shall argue for a conception of risk
that is starklydifferent from this traditional view. This new approachhighlightsthe subjective and
value-laden nature of risk and conceptualizes risk as a game in which the rules must be socially
negotiated within the context of a specific problem.
3.0 The Subjective and Value-Laden Nature of Risk Assessment
Attempts to manage risk must confront the question: "What is risk?" The dominant
conception views risk as "the chance of injury, damage, or loss" (Webster, 1983). The probabilities
and consequences of adverse events are assumed to be produced by physical and natural processes
in ways that can be objectively quantified by riskassessment. Much social science analysis rejects
this notion, arguing instead that risk is inherently subjective (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1992; Krimsky
& Golding, 1992; Otway, 1992; Pidgeon, Hood, Jones, Turner, & Gibson, 1992; Slovic, 1992;
Wynne, 1992). In this view, risk does not exist"out there," independent of our mindsand cultures,
waiting to be measured. Instead, human beings have invented the concept risk to help them
understand and cope with thedangers and uncertainties of life. Although these dangers are real,
there is no such thing as "real risk" or "objective risk." The nuclear engineer's probabilistic risk
estimate for a nuclear accident or the toxicologist's quantitative estimate of a chemical's
carcinogenic riskare both based ontheoretical models, whose structure is subjective and
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assumption-laden, and whose inputs are dependent on judgment. As we shall see, nonscientists have
their own models, assumptions, and subjective assessment techniques (intuitive risk assessments),
which are sometimes very different from the scientists' models.
One way in which subjectivity permeates risk assessments is in the dependence of such
assessments on judgments at every stage of the process, from the initial structuring of a risk problem
to deciding which endpoints or consequences to include in the analysis, identifying and estimating
exposures, choosing dose-response relationships, and so on.
For example, even the apparently simple task of choosing a risk measure for a well-defined
endpoint such as human fatalities is surprisingly complexand judgmental. Table 2 shows a few of
the many different ways that fatality riskscan be measured. How should we decide whichmeasure
to use when planning a risk assessment, recognizing that the choice is likely to make a big
difference in how the risk is perceived and evaluated?
An example taken from Wilson and Crouch (1983) demonstrates how the choice of one
measure or another can make a technology look either more or less risky. For example, between
1950 and 1970, coal mines became much less risky in terms of deaths from accidents per ton of
coal, but they became marginally riskier in terms of deaths from accidents per employee. Which
measure one thinks more appropriate for decision making depends on one's point of view. From a
national point of view, giventhat a certain amount of coal has to be obtained, deaths per million
tons of coal is the more appropriate measure of risk, whereas from a labor leader's point of view,
deaths per thousand personsemployed may be more relevant.
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Table 2
Some ways of expressing mortality risks
• Deaths per million people in the population
• Deaths per million people within x miles of the source of exposure
• Deaths per unit of concentration
• Deaths per facility
• Deaths per ton of air toxic released
• Deaths per ton of air toxic absorbed by people
• Deaths per ton of chemical produced
• Deaths per million dollars of product produced
• Loss of life expectancy associated with exposure to the hazard
Each way of summarizing deaths embodies its own set of values (National Research
Council, 1989). For example, "reduction in life expectancy" treats deaths of young people as more
important than deaths of older people, who have less life expectancy to lose. Simply counting
fatalities treats deaths of the old and young as equivalent; it also treats as equivalent deaths that
come immediately after mishaps and deaths that follow painful and debilitating disease or long
periods during which many who will not suffer disease live in daily fear of that outcome. Using
"number of deaths" as the summary indicator of risk implies that it is as important to prevent deaths
of people who engage in an activity by choice and deaths of those who have been benefiting from a
risky activity or technology as to protect those who get no benefit from it. One can easily imagine a
range of arguments to justify different kinds of unequal weightings for different kinds of deaths, but
to arrive at any selection requires a value judgment concerningwhich deaths one considers most
undesirable. To treat the deaths as equal also involves a value judgment.
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3.1 Framing the Risk Information
After a risk analysishas "negotiated,"all the subjective steps of defining the problemand its
options, selecting and measuring risks in terms of particularoutcomes, determining the people at
risk and their exposure parameters, and so on, one comes to the presentation of this information to
the decision maker, often referred to as "framing." This process of presentation is also rife with
subjectivity.
Numerous research studies have demonstrated that different (but logically equivalent) ways
of presenting the same risk information can lead to different evaluations and decisions. One
dramatic example of this comes from a study by McNeil, Pauker, Sox, and Tversky (1982), who
asked people to imagine that they had lung cancer and had to choose between two therapies, surgery
or radiation. The two therapies were described in some detail. Then one group of subjects was
presented with the cumulative probabilities of surviving for varying lengths of time after the
treatment. A second group of subjects received the same cumulative probabilities framed in terms of
dying rather than surviving (e.g., instead of being told that 68% of those having surgery will have
survived after one year, they were told that 32% will have died). Framing the statistics in terms of
dying changed the percentage of subjects choosing radiation therapy over surgery from 18% to 44%.
The effect was as strong for physicians as for laypersons.
Equally striking changes in preference result from framing the information about
consequences in terms of either lives saved or lives lost (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) or from
describing an improvement in a river's water quality as a restoration of lost quality or an
improvement from the current level (Gregory, Lichtenstein, & MacGregor, 1993).
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We now know that every form of presenting risk information is a frame that has a strong
influence on the decision maker. Moreover, when we contemplate the equivalency of lives saved vs.
lives lost, mortality rates vs. survival rates, restoring lost water quality vs. improving water quality,
and so forth, we see that there are often no "right frames" or "wrong frames" —just "different
frames."
3.2 The Multidimensionality of Risk
As noted above, research has also shown that the public has a broad conception of risk,
qualitative and complex, that incorporates considerations such as uncertainty, dread, catastrophic
potential, controllability, equity, risk to future generations, and so forth, into the risk equation. In
contrast, experts' perceptions of risk are not closely related to these dimensions or the characteristics
that underlie them. Instead, studies show that experts tend to see riskiness as synonymous with
expected mortality, consistent with the dictionary definition given above and consistent with the
ways that risks tend to be characterized in risk assessments (see, for example, Cohen, 1985). As a
resultof these different perspectives, many conflicts over"risk" may result from experts and
laypeople having different definitions of the concept. In this light, it is not surprising that expert
recitations of "risk statistics" often do little to change people's attitudes and perceptions.
There are legitimate, value-laden issues underlying the multiple dimensions of public risk
perceptions, and these values need to be considered in risk-policy decisions. For example, is risk
from cancer (a dread disease) worse than risk from auto accidents (not dreaded)? Is a risk imposed
on a child more serious than a known risk accepted voluntarily by an adult? Are the deaths of 50
passengers in separate automobile,accidents equivalent to the deaths of 50 passengers in one
airplane crash? Is the risk from a polluted Superfundsite worse if the site is located in a
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neighborhood that has a number of other hazardous facilities nearby? The difficult questions
multiplywhen outcomes other than humanhealth and safetyare considered.
3.3 The Risk Game
There are clearly multiple conceptions of risk (Shrader-Frechette, 1991). Dean and
Thompson (1995) note that the traditional viewof riskcharacterized by the event probabilities and
consequences treats the many subjective and contextual factors described above as secondary or
accidental dimensions of risk, just as coloration might be thought of as a secondary or accidental
dimension of an eye. Accidental dimensions might be extremely influential in the formation of
attitudes toward risk,just as having blue or browncoloration may be influential in forming attitudes
toward eyes. Furthermore, it may be that all risks possess some accidental dimensions, just as all
organs of sight are in some way colored. Nevertheless, accidental dimensions do not serve as criteria
for determining whether someone is or is notat risk, just as coloration is irrelevant to whether
something is or is not an eye.
I believe that the multidimensional, subjective, value-laden, frame-sensitive nature of risky
decisions, as described above, supports a very different view, whichDean and Thompson call "the
contextualist conception." This conception placesprobabilities and consequences on the list of
relevant risk attributes along with voluntariness, equity, and other important contextual parameters.
On the contextualist view, the concept of risk is more like the concept of a game than the concept of
the eye. Games have time limits, rules of play, opponents, criteria forwinning or losing, and so on,
but none of these attributes is essential to the concept of a game, nor is any of them characteristic of
all games. Similarly, a contextualist view ofrisk assumes that risks are characterized by some
combination of attributes such as voluntariness, probability, intentionality, equity, and so on, but
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that no one of these attributes is essential. The bottom line is that, just as there is no universal set of
rules for games, there is no universal set of characteristics for describing risk. The characterization
must depend on which risk game is being played.
4.0 Sex, Politics, and Emotion in Risk Judgments
Given the complex and subjective nature of risk, it should not surprise us that many
interesting andprovocative things occur when people judge risks. Recent studies have shown that
factors such as gender, race, political worldviews, affiliation, emotional affect, and trust are strongly
correlated with riskjudgments. Equally important is thatthese factors influence thejudgments of
experts as well as judgments of laypersons.
4.1 Sex
Sex is strongly related to risk judgments and attitudes. Several dozens of studies have
documented the finding that men tend to judge risks as smaller and less problematic than do women
(Brody, 1984; Carney, 1971; DeJoy, 1992; Gutteling &Wiegman, 1993; Gwartney-Gibbs &Lach,
1991; Pillisuk& Acredolo, 1988; Sjoberg & Drottz-Sjoberg, 1993; Slovic, Flynn, Mertz, &
Mullican, 1993; Slovic, Kraus, Lappe, Letzel, & Malmfors, 1989; Spigner, Hawkins, & Loren,
1993; Steger & Witte, 1989; Stern, Dietz, & Kalof, 1993).
A number of hypotheses have been putforward to explain sex differences in risk perception.
One approach has been to focus on biological and social factors. For example, women have been
characterized as more concerned about human health and safety because they give birth and are
socialized to nurture and maintain life (Steger & Witte, 1989). They have beencharacterized as
physically more vulnerable to violence, such as rape, for example, and this may sensitize them to
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other risks (Baumer, 1978; Riger, Gordon, & LeBailly, 1978). The combination of biology and
social experience has been put forward as the source of a "different voice" that is distinct to women
(Gilligan, 1982; Merchant, 1980).
A lack of knowledge and familiarity with science and technology has also been suggested as
a basis for these differences, particularly with regard to nuclear and chemical hazards. Women are
discouraged from studying science and there are relatively few women scientists and engineers
(Alpen, 1993). However, Barke, Jenkins-Smith, and Slovic (1995) have found that female physical
scientists judge risks from nuclear technologies to be higher than do male physical scientists.
Similar results with scientists were obtained by Malmfors, Mertz, Neil, Purchase, and Slovic (1996),
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Environmental tobacco smoke
Ozone depletion
Nonprescription drugs
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Dioxins
Breast implants
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Figure 1. Perceived health risk to the average exposed British citizen as judged by
members of the British Toxicological Society. Percent difference is percent female
moderate and high risk responses minus percent male moderate and high risk
responses (N= 92 females and 208 males). Source: Malmfors, Mertz, Neil,
Purchase, and Slovic (1996).
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who found that female members of the British Toxicological Society were far more likely than male
toxicologists to judge societal risks as high (see Figure 1). Certainly the female scientists in the
studies by Barke et al. and Malmfors et al. cannot be accused of lacking knowledge and
technological literacy. Something else must be going on.
Hints about the origin of these sex differences come from a study by Flynn, Slovic, and .
Mertz (1994) in which 1512 Americans were asked, for each of 25 hazard items, to indicate whether
the hazard posed (1) little or no risk, (2) slight risk, (3) moderate risk, or (4) high risk to society.
Figure 2 shows the difference in the percentage of males and females who rated a hazard as a "high
risk." All differences are to the right of the 0% mark, indicating that the percentage of high-risk
responses was greater for women on every item. A similar graph (Figure 3) shows that the
percentage of high-risk responses was greater among people of color than among white respondents
for every item studied.
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Figure 2. Perceived health risks to American public by
gender: difference between males and females. Base
percent equals male high-risk response. Percent difference is
female high-risk response minus male high-risk response.
Source: Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz (1994).
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Figure 3. Perceived health risks to American public by race:
difference between whites and nonwhites. Base percent
equals white high-risk response. Percent difference is
nonwhite high-risk response minus white high-risk response.
Source: Flynn et al. (1994).
Perhaps the most striking result from this studyis shown in Figure 4, whichpresents the
mean risk ratings separately for white males, white females, nonwhitemales, and nonwhite females.
Across the 25 hazards, white males produced risk-perception ratings that were consistently much
lower than the means of the other three groups.
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Figure 4. Mean risk-perception ratings by race and
gender. Source: Flynn et al. (1994).
When the data underlying Figure 4 were examined more closely, Flynn et al. observed that
not all whitemales perceived risks as low. The "white-male effect" appeared to be caused by about
30% of the white-male sample whojudged risks to be extremely low. The remaining white males
were not much different from the other subgroups with regard to perceived risk.
What differentiated these white maleswho were most responsible for the effect from the rest
of the sample, including other whitemales whojudged risks as relatively high? When compared to
the remainderof the sample, the group of white males with the lowestrisk-perception scoreswere
better educated (42.7% college or postgraduate degree vs. 26.3% in the other group), hadhigher
household incomes (32.1% above $50,000 vs. 21.0%), and were politically more conservative
(48.0% conservative vs. 33.2%). Although perceived risk was inversely related to income and
educational level, controlling for these differences statistically did not reduce much of the white-
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male effect on risk perception. Figure 5 shows, for example, that white males exhibited far lower
perceived risk at each of three levels of income and educational status.
Particularly noteworthy is the finding that the low risk-perception subgroup of white males
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Figure 5. Risk-perception index by race, gender,
income and education. Source: National Survey
conducted by Decision Research
also held very differentattitudes than the other respondents. Specifically, they were more likely than
the others to:
• Agree that future generations can take care of themselves when facing risks imposedupon
them from today's technologies (64.2% vs. 46.9%).
• Agree that if a risk is very small it is okay for society to impose that risk on individuals
without their consent (31.7% vs. 20.8%).
• Agree that science cansettle differences of opinion about the risks of nuclear power
(61.8% vs. 50.4%).
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• Agree that government and industry can be trusted with making the proper decisions to
manage the risks from technology (48.0% vs. 31.1%).
• Agree that we can trust the experts and engineers who build, operate, and regulate nuclear
power plants (62.6% vs. 39.7%).
• Agree that we have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country (42.7% vs. 30.9%).
• Agree with the use of capitalpunishment (88.2% vs. 70.5%).
• Disagree that technological development is destroying nature (56.9% vs. 32.8%).
• Disagree that they have very little control over risks to their health (73.6% vs. 63.1%).
• Disagree that the world needs a more equal distribution of wealth (42.7% vs. 31.3%).
• Disagree that local residents should have the authority to close a nuclear power plant if
they think it is not run properly (50.4% vs. 25.1%).
• Disagree that the public should vote to decide on issues such as nuclear power (28.5%) vs.
16.7%).
In sum, the subgroup of white males who perceive risks to be quite low can be characterized
by trust in institutions and authorities and by anti-egalitarian attitudes, including a disinclination
toward giving decision-makingpower to citizens in areas of risk management.
The results of this study raise new questions. What does it mean for the explanations of
genderdifferences whenwe see that the sizable differences between white malesand white females
do not exist for nonwhite males and nonwhite females? Why do a substantial percentage of white
males see the world as so much less risky than everyone else sees it?
Obviously, the salience of biology is reduced by these data on risk perception and race.
Biological factors should apply to nonwhite men and women as well as to white people. Thepresent
data thus move us awayfrom biology and toward sociopolitical explanations. Perhaps white males
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see less risk in the world because they create, manage, control, andbenefit from many of the major
technologies and activities. Perhaps women and nonwhite men see the worldas more dangerous
because in many ways they are more vulnerable, because they benefit less frommany of its
technologies and institutions, and because theyhave lesspowerand control overwhat happens in
their communities and their lives. Although the survey conducted by Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz was
not designed to test these alternative explanations, the race and gender differences in perceptions
and attitudes point toward the role of power, status, alienation, trust, perceived government
responsiveness, and other sociopolitical factors, in determining perception and acceptance of risk.
Inasmuch as these sociopolitical factors shape public perception of risks, we can see why
traditional attempts to make people see the world as white males do, by showing them statistics and
risk assessments, are unlikely to succeed. The problem of risk conflict and controversy goes beyond
science. It is deeply rooted in the social and political fabric of our society.
4.2 Risk Perception and Worldviews
The influence of social, psychological, and political factors also can be seen in studies
examining the impact of worldviews on risk judgments.
Worldviews are general social, cultural, and political attitudes that appear to have an
influence over people's judgments about complex issues (Buss, Craik, & Dake, 1986; Dake, 1991;
Jasper, 1990). Dake (1991) has conceptualized worldviews as "orienting dispositions," because of
their role in guiding people's responses. Some of the worldviews identified to date are listed below,
along with representative attitude statements:
• Fatalism (e.g., "I feel I have very little control over risks to my health").
• Hierarchy (e.g., "Decisions about health risks should be left to the experts").
• Individualism (e.g., "In a fair system, people with more ability should earn more").
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• Egalitarianism (e.g., "Ifpeople were treated more equally, we would have fewer
problems").
• Technological Enthusiasm (e.g., "A high-technology society is important for improving our
health and social well-being").
People differ from one another in these views. Fatalists tend to think that what happens in
life is preordained and one cannot change that. Hierarchists like a society organized such that
commands flow down from authorities and obedience flows up the hierarchy. Egalitarians prefer a
world in which power and wealth are more evenly distributed. Individualists like to do their own
thing, unhindered by government or any other kind of constraints.
Dake (1991, 1992), Jenkins-Smith (1993) and others have measured worldviews with survey
techniques and found them to be strongly linked to public perceptions of risk. My colleagues and I
have obtained similar results. Peters and Slovic (in press), using the same national survey data
analyzed for race and gender effects by Flynn et al. (1994), found particularly strong correlations
between worldviews and attitudes toward nuclear power. Egalitarians tended to be strongly anti-
nuclear; persons endorsing fatalist, hierarchist, and individualistic views tended to be pro-nuclear.
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate these findings for one individualismitem (Table 3) and one egalitarian item
(Table 4).
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Table 3
Agreement or disagreement with an individualism worldview is associated with percentage of
respondents who support building new nuclear power plants
Individualism worldview: In a fair Build new nuclear
system people with more ability
should earn more
power plants3
(percent agree)
Strongly disagree 37.5%
Disagree 37.7
Agree 47.2
Strongly agree 53.4
aThe precise statement was: If your community was faced with a potential shortage of electricity, do you agree or
disagree that a new nuclear power plant should be built to supply that electricity?
Table 4
Agreement or disagreement with an egalitarian worldview is associated with percentage of
respondents who support building new nuclear power plants
Egalitarian worldview: What this
world needs is a more equal
distribution of wealth
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Agree
Strongly agree
Build new nuclear
power plants3
(percent agree)
73.9%
53.7
43.8
33.8
aThe precise statement was: If your community was faced with a potential shortage of electricity, do you agree or
disagree that a new nuclear power plant should be built to supply that electricity?
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When scales measuring the various worldviews were combined into a regression equation they
exhibited considerable ability to predict perceptions of risk from nuclear power and attitudes toward
accepting a new nuclear power plant in one's community (see Figure 6).
Actual
nuclear
support
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
^26%^^
^45%^^
^54^^^
^(35%^^
00%
Quartile 1
Low
Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
High
Predicted nuclear support
Figure 6. Relationship between predictions of nuclear support based on fatalism, hierarchism,
individualism, and egalitarian worldviews and actual nuclear support. Actual nuclear support was
based on the percent agreeing that, if their community was faced with a potential shortage of
electricity, a new nuclear power plant should be built to supply that electricity.
4.3 Risk Perception and Affect
The studies described in the preceding section illustrate the role of worldviews as orienting
mechanisms. Research suggests that affect is also an orienting mechanism that directs fundamental
psychological processes such as attention, memory, and informationprocessing. Zajonc (1980), for
example, argued that affective reactions to stimuli are often the very first reactions, occurring
without extensiveperceptualand cognitive encoding and subsequently guiding information
processing andjudgment. According to Zajonc, all perceptions may contain someaffect. "We do not
just see 'a house:' We seea handsome house, an ugly house, or a pretentious house" (p. 154).
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He later adds, "We sometimes delude ourselves that we proceed in a rational manner and weigh all
the pros and cons of the various alternatives. But this is probably seldom the actual case. Quite often
T decided in favor ofX' is no more than T liked X' . .. . We buy the cars we 'like,' choose the jobs
and houses we find 'attractive,' and then justify these choices by various reasons ..." (p. 155).
IfZajonc is correct regarding the primacy and automaticity of affect, then affective reactions
may also serve as orienting dispositions. Affect and worldviews may thus be functionally similar in
that both may help us navigate quickly and efficiently through a complex, uncertain, and sometimes
dangerous world. This view is schematized in Figure 7, which indicates that people's perceptions of
risk and acceptance of risk and their trust in risk management are based on knowledge and
experience. But the model in this figure also assumes that knowledge, experience, and ultimately
our risk evaluations are themselves colored by two overarching phenomena — worldviews and
affect.
Figure 7. Schematic model of worldviewsand
affect as orienting dispositions.
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One demonstration of the influence of affect on risk perception comes from a study by
Johnson and Tversky (1983). They found that reading about a tragic death increased people's
frequency estimates for many other causes of death. Johnson and Tversky interpreted this as an.
indication that the negative affect generated by the tragic story influenced all the subsequent
estimates, regardless of the similarity between the tragic event and other fatal events.
Support for the conception of affect as an orienting mechanism also comes from a study by
Alhakami and Slovic (1994). They observed that, whereas the risks and benefits to society from
various activities and technologies (e.g., nuclear power, commercial aviation) tend to be positively
associated in the world, they are inversely correlated in people's minds (higher perceived benefit is
associated with lower perceived risk; lower perceived benefit is associated with higher perceived
risk). This inverse relationship had been observedpreviously in numerous studies of risk perception
(e.g., Fischhoff, Slovic,Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978; Slovic, Kraus, Lappe, & Major, 1991).
Alhakami and Slovic found that this inverse relationship was linked to people's reliance on general
affective evaluations when making risk/benefit judgments. When the affective evaluation was
favorable (as withautomobiles, for example), the activity or technology being judged was seen as
having high benefitand low risk; whenthe evaluation was unfavorable (e.g., as with pesticides),
risks tended to be seen as high and benefits as low. It thus appears that the affective response is
primary, and the riskand benefit judgments are derived (at least partly) from it.
Slovic, Flynn, andLayman (1991) and Slovic, Layman, Kraus, Flynn, Chalmers, and Gesell
(1991) studied the relationship between affect and perceived risk forhazards related to nuclear
power. Forexample, Slovic, Layman, and Flynn asked respondents "What is the first thought or
image that comes to mind when you hear the phrase 'nuclear waste repository?'" After providing up
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to three associations to the repository stimulus, each respondent rated the affective quality of these
associations on a five-point scale, ranging from extremely negative to extremely positive.
Although most of the images that people evoke when asked to think about nuclear power or
nuclear waste are affectively negative (e.g., death, destruction, war, catastrophe), some are positive
(e.g., abundant electricity and the benefits it brings). The affective values of these positive and
negative images appear to sum in a way that is predictive of our attitudes, perceptions, and
behaviors. If the balance is positive, we respond favorably; if it is negative, we respond unfavorably.
For example, the affective quality of a person's associations to a nuclear waste repository was found
to be related to whether the person would vote for or against a referendum on a nuclear waste
repository and to their judgments regarding the risk of a repository accident. Specifically, more than
90% of those people whose first image was judged very negative said that they would vote against a
repository in Nevada; fewer than 50% of those people whose first image was positive said they
would vote against the repository (Slovic, Flynn et al., 1991).
Using data from the national survey of 1500Americans describedearlier, Peters and Slovic
(in press) found that the affective ratings of associations to the stimulus "nuclear power" were
highly predictiveof responses to the question: "If your community was faced with a shortageof
electricity, do you agree or disagree that a new nuclearpowerplant shouldbe built to supply that
electricity?" Among the 25% of respondents with the most positive associations to nuclear power,
69% agreed to building a new plant. Among the 25% of respondents with the most negative
associations, only 13% agreed. A comparison of these percentages with those in the extreme
quartiles of Figure 6 (65%) and26%, respectively) shows thataffect was even more powerful as a
predictor ofnuclear power support than the combined worldviews. When affect plus thevarious
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worldviews were combined into one prediction equation, the ability to predict support for nuclear
power was even stronger (see Figure 8).
Actual 100%
nuclear
support
Quartile 1
Low
Quartile 2 Quartile 3
Predicted nuclear support
Quartile 4
High
Figure 8. Relationship between predictions of nuclear support based on affect and worldviews and
actual nuclear support. Actual nuclear support was based on the percent agreeing that, if their
community was faced with a potential shortage of electricity, a new nuclear power plant should be
built to supply that electricity. Source: Peters and Slovic (in press).
4.4 Worldviews. Affect, and Toxicology
Affect and worldviews seem to influence the risk-related judgments of scientists, as well as
laypersons. Evidence for this comes from studies of"intuitive toxicology" that Torbjom Malmfors,
Nancy Neil, Iain Purchase, and I have been conducting in the U.S., Canada, and the UK during the
past eight years. These studieshave surveyed both toxicologists and laypersons about a wide range
of concepts relating to risks from chemicals. We have examined judgments about the effectsof
chemical concentration, dose, and exposure on risk. We have also questioned our respondents about
the value of animal studies for predicting the effects of chemicals on humans. Before showing how
worldviews and affect enter into toxicologists' judgments, a brief description of some basic results
will be presented.
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Consider two survey items that wehave studied repeatedly. One is statement Sj: "Would
you agree or disagree that the way an animal reacts to a chemical is a reliable predictor ofhow a
human wouldreact to it?" The second statement, S2, is a little more specific: "If a scientific study
produces evidence that a chemical causes cancer in animals, then we can be reasonably sure that the
chemical will cause cancer in humans."
When members of the American and Canadian public responded to these items, they showed
moderate agreementwith Sj; about half the peopleagreedand half disagreed that animal tests were
reliable predictors of humanreactions to chemicals. However, in response to S2, whichstatedthat
the animal study found evidence of cancer, there was a jump in agreement to about 70% among both
men and women respondents (see Figure 9). The important point about the pattern of response is
that agreement was higher on the second item.
U.S. Public (1988)
Percent agree
Women
S, S2
• !_
Figure 9. Agreement among members
of the public in the United States for
Statement 1 '(S,): "The way that an
animal reacts to a chemical is a reliable
predictor of how a human would react to
it" and S2: "If a scientific study produces
evidence that a chemical causes cancer
in animals, then we can be reasonably
sure that the chemical will cause cancer
in humans." Source: Kraus, Malmfors,
and Slovic (1992).
What happens if toxicologists are asked about these two statements? Figure 10 shows that
toxicologists in the U-S. and toxicologists in the UK responded similarly to the public on the first
statement but differently on the second. They exhibited the same rather middling level of agreement
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with the general statement about animal studies as predictors of human health effects.1 However,
when these studies were saidto find evidence of carcinogenicity in animals, then the toxicologists
were less likely to agree that the results could be extrapolated to humans. Thus, the same findings
which lead toxicologists to be less willing to generalize to humans lead the public to see the
chemical asmore dangerous for humans.2
U.S. Data (1988)
Percent agree
90%
S, S2
U.S. Toxicologists U.K. Toxicologists
W=170 A/-312
Figure 10. Agreement with two
statements, S1 and S2, regarding the
extrapolation of chemical effects in
animals to chemical effects in humans.
Figure 11 presents the responses for S] and S2 among men and women toxicologists in the
UK (208 men and 92 women). Here we see anotherinteresting finding. The men agree less on the
second statement than on the first, but the women agree more, just like the general public.
Womentoxicologists are more willing than men to say that one can generalize to humans from the
positive carcinogenicity findings in animals.
We created a changescore between statements Sj and S2, with each individual getting a
score of increasing agreement, decreasing agreement, or no change. Selected correlations between
this change score and other items in the survey ofBritish toxicologists are shown in Table 5. A
1 This is actually a very surprising result, given the heavy reliance on animal studies in toxicology.
This pattern suggests that animal studies may be scaring the public without informing science.
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Percent agree
90%
S, S,
Figure 11. Agreement of men and
women toxicologists in the United
Kingdom with two statements regarding
extrapolation of chemical effects in
animals to chemical effects in humans.
Men
(-23, n = 208)
Women
(+11,n = 92)
positive change score (meaning greater agreementwith S2 than with Sj) was associated with:
• Higher mean perceptions of risk across 25 hazards (the risk-perception index)
• Rating pesticides and industrial chemicals as "bad" on the affective rating task
• Being female
• Being younger
• Agreeing that "I have little control over risks to my health"
Table 5
Correlations with the S2-S1 Change Score
British Society of Toxicology (N = 312)
• Belief that there is a threshold dose for nongenotoxic carcinogens
• Risk Perception Index (average across 25 items)
• Pesticides: Bad — Good rating
• Industrial chemicals: Bad — Good rating
• Sex: female
• Age: young
• Agree to accept some risk to strengthen economy
• I have little control over health risks
• Respondent works in an academic position
• Technology is important for social well being
• Economic growth is necessary for quality of life
• Respondent works in industry
Note: All correlations are significant at p < .01.
-.33
.26
-.26
-.25
.25
-.23
-.23
.22
.19
-.17
-.17
-.16
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• Holding an academic position rather than a position in industry
• Disagreeing that technology is important for social well-being
• Disagreeing that economic growth is necessary for good quality of life.
These studies of intuitive toxicology have yielded a number of intriguing findings. One is the
low percentage of agreementthat animal studies can predicthuman health effects. Another is that
toxicologists showeven less confidence in studies that find cancerin animals resulting from
chemical exposure. The public has high confidence in animal studies that find cancer.
Disagreements among toxicologists are systematically linked to gender, affiliation (academic vs.
other), worldviews, and affect. Thus affective and sociopolitical factors appear to influence
scientists' risk evaluations inmuch the same Way as they influence the public's perceptions.3
5.0 Trust
5.1 The Importance of Trust
The research described above has painted a portrait of risk perception influenced by the
interplay of psychological, social, and political factors. Members Ofthe public and experts can
disagree about risk because they define risk differently, have different worldviews, different
affective experiences and reactions, or different social status. Another reason why the public often
rejects scientists' risk assessments is lack of trust. Trust in risk management, like risk perception,
has been found to correlate with gender, race, worldviews, and affect.
Although we have focused only on the relationship between toxicologists' reaction to chemicals and their
responses to S] and S2, thereweremay other links between affect and attitudes in the survey. For example, the very
simple bad-good rating of pesticides correlated significantly (r = .20) with agreement that there is a threshold dose
for nongenotoxic carcinogens. The same rating correlated .27 with the belief that synergistic effects of chemicals
cause animal studies of single chemicals to underestimate risk to humans.
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Social relationships of all types, including riskmanagement, relyheavily on trust. Indeed,
much of the contentiousness that has been observed in the risk-management arenahas been
attributed toa climate ofdistrust that exists between the public, industry, and risk-management
professionals (e.g., SloVic, 1993; Slovic, Flynn et al., 1991). The limited effectiveness of risk-
communication efforts canbe attributed to the lack of trust. If you trust the riskmanager,
communication is relatively easy. If trust is lacking, no form or process of communication will be
satisfactory (Fessenden-Raden, Fitchen, & Heath, 1987).
5.2 How Trust Is Created and Destroyed
One of the most fundamental qualities of trust has been known forages. Trust is fragile. It is
typically created rather slowly, but it canbe destroyed in an instant — by a single mishap or
mistake. Thus, once trust is lost, it may take a long time to rebuild it to its former state. In some
instances, lost trust may neverbe regained. Abraham Lincoln understood this quality. In a letter to
Alexander McClure, he observed: "If youonce forfeit the confidence of yourfellow citizens, you
can never regain their respect and esteem" [italics added].
The fact that trust is easier to destroy than to create reflects certain fundamental mechanisms
of humanpsychology called here "the asymmetry principle." When it comes to winning trust, the
playing field is not level. It is tilted towarddistrust, for each of the following reasons:
1. Negative (trust-destroying) events are more visible or noticeable than positive (trust-
building) events. Negative events often take the form of specific, well-defined incidents such as
accidents, lies, discoveries of errors, or other mismanagement. Positive events, while sometimes
visible, more often are fuzzy or indistinct. For example, how many positive events are represented
by the safe operation of a nuclear power plant for one day? Is this one event? dozens of events?
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hundreds? There is no precise answer. When events are invisible orpoorly defined, they carry little
or no weight in shaping our attitudes and opinions.
2. Wheneventsare well-defined anddo come to our attention, negative (trust-destroying)
events carry much greater weight thanpositive events. This important psychological tendency is
illustrated by a study in which 103 college students rated the impact on trustof 45 hypothetical news
events pertaining to the management of a large nuclearpower plant in their community (Slovic,
1993). Some of these events were designed to be trust increasing, such as:
• There have been no reported safety problems at the plant during the past year.
• There is careful selection and training of employees at the plant.
• Plant managers live nearby the plant.
• The countymedical examiner reports that the healthof people living near the plant is better
than the average for the region.
Other events were designed to be trust decreasing, such as:
• A potential safety problem was found to have been covered up by plant officials.
• Plant safety inspections are delayed in order to meet the electricity production quota for the
month.
• A nuclear power plant in another state has a serious accident.
• The county medical examiner reports that the health of people living near the plant is
worse than the average for the region.
The respondents were asked to indicate, for each event, whether their trust in the
management of the plant would be increased or decreased upon learning of that event. After doing
this, they rated how strongly their trust would be affected by the event On a scale ranging from 1
(very small impact on trust) to 7 (very powerful impact On trust).
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The percentages of Category 7 ratings, shown in Figure 12, demonstrate that negative events
are seen as far more likely to have a powerful effecton trust than are positive events. The data
shown in Table 6 are typical. The negative event, reporting plant neighbors' health as worse than
average, was rated 6 or 7 on the impact scale by 50.0% of the respondents. A matched event,
reporting neighbors' health to be better than average, was rated 6 or 7 by only 18.3%of the
respondents.
•*
Local 1
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)oard authority to close plant "^^•m !
Evacuation plan exists PM
On-site government inspector JBBi
Rewarded for finding problems ^^1
Responsive to any sign ofproblems frBB
Effective emergency action taken PB
Local advisory board established pn
Public encouraged to tour plant ^B
Mandatory drug testing
No problems for five years S TRUST
Hold regular public hearings S INCREASING
Employees carefully trained •
Conduct emergency training M
Community has access to records •
Serious accident is controlled •
Nearby health is good •
Monitor radioactive emissions 1
Employees informed ofproblems 1
Neighbors notified of problems 1
No evidence of withholding information 1
Contribute to local charities 1
Employees closely supervised 1
Try to meet with public 1
Managers live nearby 1
Operates according to regulations
No problems in past year
Record keeping is good
Don't contribute to local charities j
No public hearings
Little communication with community
Emergency response plans not rehearsed
Officials live far away
Poor record keeping
TRUST
DECREASING
Accident occurs in another state
Accused of releasing radiation
Denied access to records
Employees not informed of problems
, Delayed inspections
Public tours not permitted
Healthnearby worse than average
Official lied to government
Serious accident is controlled
No adequate emergency response plan
Plant covered up problem
Employees drunk on job .
)%-6()%• -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 6(
Percent "very powerful impact"
Figure 12. Differential impact of trust-increasing and trust-decresing
events. Note: only percentages of Category 7 ratings (very powerful
impact) are shown here. Source: Slovic (1993).
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Therewas only one eventperceived to have any substantial impact on increasing trust. This
event stated that:
"An advisory board of local citizens and environmentalists is established to monitor the
plant and is given legal authority to shut the plant down if they believe it to be unsafe."
Table 6
Judged Impact of Trust-Increasing Event and a Similar Trust-Decreasing Event
Impact on Trust
Trust-Increasing Event
The county medical examiner reports that the health of
people living near the plant is better than average.
very
small
very
powerful
21.5 14.0 10.8 18.3 17.2 16.1 2.2
Trust-Decreasing Event
The county medical examiner reports that the health of
people living near the plant is worse than average.
3.0 8.0 2.0 16.0 21.0 26.0 24.0
Note. Cell entries indicate the percentage of respondents in each impact rating category. Source: Slovic, 1993.
This strong delegation of authority to the local public was rated 6 or 7 on the impact scale by
38.4%o of the respondents. Although this was a far stronger showing than for any Otherpositive
event, it would have been a rather average performance in the distribution of impacts for negative
events.
The importance of an event is at least in part related to its frequency (or rarity). An accident
in a nuclear plant is more informative with regard to risk than is a day (or even a large number of
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days) without an accident. Thus, in systems where we are concerned about low-probability/high
consequence events, adverse events will increase ourperceptions of riskto a much greater degree
than favorable events will decrease them.
3. Adding fuel to the fire of asymmetry is yet another idiosyncrasy of humanpsychology —
sources of bad (trust-destroying) news tend to be seen as more credible than sources of good news.
The findings reported in Section 4.4 illustrate thispoint. In general, confidence in thevalidity of
animal studies is not particularly high. However, when told that a study has found that a chemical is
carcinogenic in animals, members of the public express considerable confidence in the validityof
this study for predicting health effects in humans.
4. Another important psychological tendency is that distrust, once initiated, tends to
reinforce and perpetuate distrust. This occurs in two ways. First, distrust tends to inhibit the kinds of
personal contacts and experiences that are necessary to overcome distrust. By avoiding others whose
motives or actions we distrust, we never get to see that these people are competent, well-meaning,
and trustworthy. Second, initial trust or distrust colors our interpretation of events, thus reinforcing
our prior beliefs. Persons who trusted the nuclear power industry saw the events at Three Mile
Island as demonstrating the soundness of the "defense in depth" principle, noting that the multiple
safety systems shut the plant down and contained most Ofits radiation. Persons who distrusted
nuclear power prior to the accident took an entirely different message from the same events,
perceiving that those in charge did not understand what was wrong or how to fix it and that
catastrophe was averted only by sheer luck.
5.3 "The System Destroys Trust"
Thus far we have been discussing the psychological tendencies that create and reinforce
distrust in situations of risk. Appreciation of those psychological principles leads us toward a new
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perspective on risk perception, trust, and conflict. Conflicts and controversies surrounding risk
management are not due to public irrationality or ignorance but, instead, can be seen as expected
side effects of these psychological tendencies, interacting with a highly participatory Democratic
system of government and amplified by certain powerful technological and social changes in
society. The technological change has given the electronic and print media the capability (effectively
utilized) of informing Us ofnews from all over the world — often right as it happens. Moreover, just
as individuals give greater weight and attention to negative events, so do the news media. Much of
what the media reports is bad (trust-destroying) news (Koren & Klein, 1991; Lichtenberg &
MacLean, 1992).
The second important change, a social phenomenon, is the rise of powerful special interest
groups, well funded (by a fearful public) and sophisticated in using their own experts and the media
to communicate their concerns and their distrust to the public in order to influence risk policy
debates and decisions (Wall Street Journal, 1989). The social problem is compounded by the fact
that we tend to manage our risks within an adversarial legal system that pits expert vs. expert,
contradicting each other's risk assessments and further destroying the public trust.
The young science of risk assessment is too fragile, too indirect, to prevail in such a hostile
atmosphere. Scientific analysis of risks cannot allay our fears of low-probability catastrophes or
delayed cancers unless we trust the system. In the absence of trust, science (and risk assessment) can
only feed public concerns, by uncovering more bad news. A single study demonstrating an
association between exposure to chemicals or radiation and some adverse health effect cannot easily
be offset by numerous studies.failing to find such an association. Thus, for example, the more
studies that are conducted looking for effects of electric and magnetic fields or other difficult to
evaluate hazards, the more likely it is that these studies will increase public concerns, even if the
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majority ofthese studies fail to find any association with ill health (MacGregor, Slovic, &Morgan,
1994; Morgan etal., 1985). Inshort, because evidence for lack ofrisk often carries little weight,
risk-assessment studies tend to increase perceived risk.
6.0 Resolving Risk Conflicts: Where Do We Go From Here?
6.1 Technical Solutions to Risk Conflicts
There has been no shortage ofhigh-level attention given to the risk conflictsdescribed
above. Oneprominent proposal by Justice Stephen Breyer (1993) attempts to break whathe seesas
a vicious circle of public perception, congressional overreactidn, andconservative regulation that
leads to obsessive and costly preoccupation with reducing negligible risks as well as to inconsistent
standards among health and safetyprograms. Breyer sees public mi.sperceptions of risk and low
levels of mathematical understanding at the core of excessive regulatory response. Hisproposed
solution is to create a small centralized administrative group charged with creating uniformity and
rationality in highly technical areas of riskmanagement. Thisgroup would be staffed by civil
servants with experience in health and environmental agencies, Congress, and OMB. A parallel is
drawn between this group and the prestigious Conseil d'Etat in France.
Similar frustration with the costs ofmeeting public demands led the 104th Congress to
introduce numerous billsdesigned to require all major newregulations to bejustifiedby extensive
risk assessments. Proponents of this legislation argue that such measures are necessary to ensure that
regulations are based upon "sound science" and effectivelyreduce significant risks at reasonable
costs.
The language of this.proposed legislation reflects the traditional narrow view of risk and risk
assessment based ". .. only on the best reasonably available scientific data and scientific
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understanding ..." Agencies are further directed to develop a systematic program for external peer
review using "expert bodies" or "other devices comprisedof participants selected on the basis of
their expertise relevant to the sciences involved ..." (U.S. Senate, 1995, pp. 57-58). Public
participation in this process is advocated, but no mechanismsfor this are specified.
The proposals by Breyer and the 104th Congress are typical in their call for more and better
technical analysis and expert oversight to rationalize risk management. There is no doubt that
technical analysis is vital for making risk decisions better informed, more consistent, and more
accountable. However, value conflicts and pervasive distrust in risk management cannot easily be
reduced by technicalanalysis. Trying to address risk controversies primarily with more science is, in
fact, likely to exacerbate conflict.
6.2 Process^Oriented Solutions
A major objective of this paper has been to demonstrate the complexity of risk and its
assessment. To summarize the earlier discussions, danger is'real, but risk is socially constructed.
Risk assessment is inherently subjective and represents a blending of science and judgment with
important psychological, social, cultural, and political factors. Finally, our social and democratic
institutions, remarkable as they are in many respects, breed distrust in the risk arena.
Whoever controls the definition of risk controls the rational solution to the problem at hand.
If you define risk one way, then one option will rise to the top as the most cost-effective or the safest
or the best. If you define it another way, perhaps incorporating qualitative characteristics and other
contextual factors, you will likely get a different ordering of your action solutions (Fischhoff,
Watson, & Hope, 1984). Defining risk is thus an exercise in power.
Scientific literacy and public education are important, but they are hot central to risk
controversies. The public is not irrational. The public is influenced by emotion and affect in a way
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that is bothsimple and sophisticated. So are scientists. Thepublic is influenced by worldviews,
/ ideologies, and values; so are scientists, particularly when they are working atthe limits oftheir
expertise.
The limitations of risk science, the importance and difficulty of maintaining trust, and the
subjective and contextual natureof the risk game point to the need for a new approach — one that
focuses upon introducing more public participation into both risk assessment and risk decision
making in order to make the decision process moredemocratic, improve the relevance and quality
of technical analysis, and increase the legitimacy andpublicacceptance of the resulting decisions.
Work by scholars and practitioners in Europe and North America has begun to lay the foundations
for improved methods of public participation within deliberative decision processes that include
negotiation, mediation, oversight committees, and other forms ofpublic involvement (English,
1992; Kunreuther, Fitzgerald, & Aarts, 1993; National Research Council, in press; Renn, Webler, &
Johnson, 1991; Renn, Webler, & Wiedemann, 1995).
Recognizing interested and affected citizens as legitimate partners in the exercise of risk
assessment is no short-term panacea for the problems of risk management. But serious attention to
participation and process issues may, in the long nin, lead to more satisfying and successful ways to
manage risk.
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